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Abstract
In the New Keynesian model, preference, cost-push, and monetary shocks all com-
pete with the real business cycle model’s technology shock in driving aggregate ﬂuc-
tuations. A version of this model, estimated via maximum likelihood, points to these
other shocks as being more important for explaining the behavior of output, inﬂation,
and interest rates in the postwar United States data. These results weaken the links
between the current generation of New Keynesian models and the real business cy-
cle models from which they were originally derived. They also suggest that Federal
Reserve oﬃcials have often faced diﬃcult trade-oﬀs in conducting monetary policy.
JEL: E32.
1 Introduction
The development of the forward-looking, microfounded, New Keynesian model stands, in the
eyes of many observers, as one of the past decade’s most exciting and signiﬁcant achievements
in macroeconomics. To cite just two especially prominent examples: Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (1999) place the New Keynesian model at center stage in their widely-read survey
1of recent research on monetary policy, while Woodford (2003) builds his comprehensive
monograph around the same analytic foundations.
In its simplest form, the New Keynesian model consists of just three equations. The
ﬁrst, which Kerr and King (1996) and McCallum and Nelson (1999) call the expectational
IS curve, corresponds to the log-linearization of an optimizing household’s Euler equation,
linking consumption and output growth to the inﬂation-adjusted return on nominal bonds,
that is, to the real interest rate. The second, a forward-looking version of the Phillips curve,
describes the optimizing behavior of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms that either set prices
in a randomly staggered fashion, as suggested by Calvo (1983), or face explicit costs of
nominal price adjustment, as suggested by Rotemberg (1982). The third and ﬁnal equation,
a monetary policy rule of the kind proposed by Taylor (1993), dictates that the central bank
should adjust the short-term nominal interest rate in response to changes in output and,
especially, inﬂation. The New Keynesian model brings these three equations together to
characterize the dynamic behavior of three key macroeconomic variables: output, inﬂation,
and the nominal interest rate.
Thus, the New Keynesian model places heavy emphasis on the behavior of nominal
variables, calls special attention to the workings of monetary policy rules, and contains
frequent allusions back to the traditional IS-LM framework. All this makes it easy to forget
that the New Keynesian models of today share many basic features with, and indeed were
originally derived as extensions to, a previous generation of dynamic, stochastic, general
equilibrium models: the real business cycle models of Kydland and Prescott (1982), Long
and Plosser (1983), King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988), and many others. In real business cycle
models, technology shocks play the dominant role in driving macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
Monetary policy either remains absent, as in the three papers just cited, or has minimal
eﬀects on the cyclical behavior of the economy, as in Cooley and Hansen (1989).
Yet technology shocks also play a role in the New Keynesian model where, for instance,
2an increase in productivity lowers each ﬁrm’s marginal costs and thereby feeds into its opti-
mal pricing decisions. The New Keynesian model therefore retains the idea that technology
shocks can be quite important in shaping the dynamic behavior of key macroeconomic vari-
ables. It merely reﬁnes and extends this idea by suggesting, ﬁrst, that other shocks might be
important as well and, second, that in any case the presence of nominal price rigidities helps
determine exactly how shocks of all kinds impact on and propagate through the economy.
This paper re-exposes and further explores this link between the current generation of
New Keynesian models and the previous generation of real business cycle models. More
speciﬁcally, it examines, quantitatively and with the help of formal econometric methods,
the importance of technology shocks within the New Keynesian framework.
Towards that end, section 2 of the paper develops a version of the New Keynesian model in
which three additional disturbances–to households’ preferences, to ﬁrms’ desired markups,
and to the central bank’s monetary policy rule–compete with the real business cycle model’s
technology shock in accounting for ﬂuctuations in output, inﬂation, and interest rates. Since
this New Keynesian model allows, but does not require, technology shocks to remain domi-
nant as the primary source of business cycle ﬂuctuations, it provides a useful framework in
which the most basic, technology-driven, speciﬁcation can be compared, statistically, to a
more general and ﬂexible alternative.
Section 3 of the paper then uses maximum likelihood, together with quarterly data from
the postwar United States, to estimate the parameters of this more general New Keynesian
model. There, a series of exercises conducted with the estimated model leads directly to the
paper’s main results on the role of technology shocks in the New Keynesian model. Section
4 concludes by summarizing those results and highlighting their implications.
32 The New Keynesian Model
As explained above, this section develops a version of the New Keynesian model that will
be used, later, for an econometric analysis of the relative importance of technology shocks
in generating variability in the postwar United States data. The model economy consists of
a representative household, a representative ﬁnished goods-producing ﬁrm, a continuum of
intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ [0,1], and a central bank. During each
period t =0 ,1,2,..., each intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm produces a distinct, perishable
intermediate good. Hence, intermediate goods may also be indexed by i ∈ [0,1],w h e r eﬁrm
i produces good i. The model features enough symmetry, however, to allow the analysis to
focus on the activities of a representative intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm, identiﬁed by
the generic index i. The behavior of each of these agents, together with their implications
for the evolution of equilibrium prices and quantities, will now be described in turn.
2.1 The Representative Household
The representative household enters each period t =0 ,1,2,... with money Mt−1 and bonds
Bt−1. At the beginning of the period, the household receives a lump-sum monetary transfer
Tt from the central bank. Next, the household’s bonds mature, providing Bt−1 additional
units of money. The household uses some of this money to purchase new bonds of value
Bt/rt,w h e r ert denotes the gross nominal interest rate between t and t +1 .
During period t, the household supplies ht units of labor to the various intermediate
goods-producing ﬁrms, earning Wtht in total labor income, where Wt denotes the nominal
wage. The household also consumes Ct units of the ﬁnished good, purchased at the nominal
price Pt from the representative ﬁnished goods-producing ﬁrm. Finally, at the end of period
t, the household receives nominal proﬁts Dt from the intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms.
4It then carries Mt units of money into period t +1 , chosen subject to the budget constraint
Mt−1 + Bt−1 + Tt + Wtht + Dt ≥ PtCt + Bt/rt + Mt (1)
for all t =0 ,1,2,....






t[at ln(Ct)+l n ( Mt/Pt) − (1/η)h
η
t],
with 1 >β>0 and η ≥ 1. In this utility function, the preference shock at follows the
autoregressive process
ln(at)=ρa ln(at−1)+εat, (2)
with 1 >ρ a ≥ 0, where the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation εat is normally distrib-
uted with standard deviation σa. Driscoll (2000) and Ireland (2002a) show that the additive
separability of this utility function in its three arguments–consumption, real money bal-
ances, and hours worked–is needed to obtain a conventional speciﬁcation for the model’s IS
curve that, in particular, excludes additional terms involving real balances and employment.
Meanwhile, King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) show that given this additive separability, the
logarithmic form for utility from consumption is needed for the model to be consistent with
balanced growth.




t =( at/Ct)(Wt/Pt), (3)
linking the real wage to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption,
5and the intertemporal optimality condition
at/Ct = βrtEt[(at+1/Ct+1)(Pt/Pt+1)], (4)
linking the inﬂation-adjusted nominal interest rate–that is, the real interest rate–to the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. The household’s ﬁrst-order conditions also in-
clude the budget constraint (1) with equality and an optimality condition for money holdings,
which plays the role of the model’s money demand relationship. Under an interest rate rule
for monetary policy like the one introduced below, however, this money demand equation
serves only to determine how much money the central bank needs to supply to clear markets
given its interest rate target rt. Hence, so long as the dynamic behavior of the money stock
is not of independent interest, this equation can be dropped from consideration, together
with all future reference to the variable Mt. Each of these optimality conditions must hold,
of course, for all t =0 ,1,2,....
2.2 The Representative Finished Goods-Producing Firm
During each period t =0 ,1,2,..., the representative ﬁnished goods-producing ﬁrm uses Yt(i)
u n i t so fe a c hi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o di ∈ [0,1], purchased at the nominal price Pt(i),t om a n u -
facture Yt units of the ﬁnished good according to the constant-returns-to-scale technology






As shown below and in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Steinsson (2003), θt measures the
time-varying elasticity of demand for each intermediate good; hence, it acts as a markup,
or cost-push, shock of the kind introduced into the New Keynesian model by Clarida, Gali,
6and Gertler (1999). Here, this cost-push shock follows the autoregressive process
ln(θt)=( 1− ρθ)ln(θ)+ρθ ln(θt−1)+εθt, (5)
with θ>1 and 1 >ρ θ ≥ 0, where the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation εθt is
normally distributed with standard deviation σθ.
The ﬁnished goods-producing ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts by choosing
Yt(i)=[ Pt(i)/Pt]
−θtYt
for all i ∈ [0,1] and t =0 ,1,2,...,w h i c hc o n ﬁrms that θt measures the time-varying elasticity
of demand for each intermediate good. Competition drives the ﬁnished goods-producing







for all t =0 ,1,2,....
2.3 The Representative Intermediate Goods-Producing Firm
During each period t =0 ,1,2,..., the representative intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm hires
ht(i) units of labor from the representative household to manufacture Yt(i) units of interme-
diate good i according to the constant-returns-to-scale technology described by
Ztht(i) ≥ Yt(i). (6)
7Here, as in many versions of the real business cycle model, the aggregate technology shock
Zt follows a random walk with positive drift:
ln(Zt)=l n ( z)+l n ( Zt−1)+εzt, (7)
with z>1, where the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation εzt is normally distributed
with standard deviation σz.
Since the intermediate goods substitute imperfectly for one another in producing the
ﬁnished good, the representative intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm sells its output in a
monopolistically competitive market: during period t, the intermediate goods-producing
ﬁrm sets the price Pt(i) for its output, subject to the requirement that it satisfy the ﬁnished
goods-producing ﬁrm’s demand at its chosen price. In addition, the intermediate goods-
producing ﬁrm faces an explicit cost of nominal price adjustment, measured in terms of the









where φ ≥ 0 governs the magnitude of the price adjustment cost and π ≥ 1 measures the
gross steady-state rate of inﬂation.
This quadratic cost of nominal price adjustment, ﬁrst proposed by Rotemberg (1982),
makes the intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm’s problem dynamic. In particular, the ﬁrm







t(at/Ct) measures the marginal utility value to the representative household of an




























measures real proﬁts, incorporating the linear production function from (6) as well as the
requirement that the ﬁrm produce and sell output on demand at its chosen price Pt(i) during



















































for all t =0 ,1,2,.... In the special case where φ =0 , (9) collapses to
Pt(i)=[ θt/(θt − 1)](Wt/Zt),
indicating that in the absence of costly price adjustment, the intermediate goods-producing
ﬁrm sets its markup of price Pt(i) over marginal cost Wt/Zt equal to θt/(θt−1) where, again,
θt measures the price elasticity of demand for its output. Thus, more generally, θt can be
interpreted as a shock to the ﬁrm’s desired markup; with costly price adjustment, the ﬁrm’s
actual markup will diﬀer from, but tend to gravitate towards, the desired markup over time.
2.4 Symmetric Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, all intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms make identical decisions,
so that Yt(i)=Yt, ht(i)=ht, Pt(i)=Pt,a n dDt(i)=Dt for all i ∈ [0,1] and t =0 ,1,2,....
In addition, the market-clearing conditions Mt = Mt−1+Tt and Bt = Bt−1 =0must hold for
9all t =0 ,1,2,.... With these equilibrium conditions imposed, (3), (6), and (8) can be used to
solve out for the real wage Wt/Pt, hours worked ht,a n dr e a lp r o ﬁts Dt/Pt. The representative
household’s budget constraint (1) can then be rewritten as the aggregate resource constraint








the household’s Euler equation (4) can be rewritten as
at/Ct = βrtEt[(at+1/Ct+1)(1/πt+1)], (11)






































where πt = Pt/Pt−1 denotes the gross inﬂation rate for all t =0 ,1,2,....
2.5 Eﬃcient Allocations and the Output Gap
As a ﬁrst step in interpreting the model’s equilibrium conditions, consider the problem faced
by a social planner who can overcome the frictions that cause real money balances to show
up in the representative household’s utility function and that give rise to the cost of nominal
price adjustment facing the representative intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm. During each
period t =0 ,1,2,..., this social planner allocates nt(i) units of the representative household’s
labor to produce Qt(i) units of each intermediate good i ∈ [0,1], then uses those various
intermediate goods to produce Qt units of the ﬁnished good, all according to the same
10constant-returns-to-scale technologies described above.
Thus, the social planner chooses Qt and nt(i) for all i ∈ [0,1] and t =0 ,1,2,... to

























for all t =0 ,1,2,.... According to this deﬁnition, the eﬃcient level of output increases after
a favorable preference shock at or technology shock Zt. By contrast, the eﬃcient level of
output does not depend on the realization of the cost-push shock θt. The model’s output
gap xt,d e ﬁned as the ratio between the actual and eﬃcient levels of output, can therefore
be calculated as
xt =( 1 /at)
1/η(Yt/Zt) (13)
for all t =0 ,1,2,....
2.6 The Linearized Model
Equations (2), (5), (7), and (10)-(13) describe the behavior of the ﬁve endogenous variables
Yt, Ct, πt, rt,a n dxt and the three exogenous shocks at, θt,a n dZt. These equations imply
that in equilibrium, output Yt and consumption Ct both inherit a unit root from the process
11(7) for the technology shock Zt. On the other hand, the stochastically detrended variables
yt = Yt/Zt, ct = Ct/Zt,a n dzt = Zt/Zt−1 remain stationary, as do the output gap xt and the
growth rate of output gt,d e ﬁned as
gt = Yt/Yt−1 (14)
for all t =0 ,1,2,....
These equations also imply that in the absence of shocks, the economy converges to a
steady-state growth path, along which all of the stationary variables are constant over time,
with yt = y, ct = c, πt = π, rt = r, xt = x, gt = g, at =1 , θt = θ,a n dzt = z for all
t =0 ,1,2,.... Accordingly, let ˆ yt =l n ( yt/y), ˆ ct =l n ( ct/c), ˆ πt =l n ( πt/π), ˆ rt =l n ( rt/r),
ˆ xt =l n ( xt/x), ˆ gt =l n ( gt/g), ˆ at =l n ( at), ˆ θt =l n ( θt/θ),a n dˆ zt =l n ( zt/z) denote the
percentage deviation of each variable from its steady-state level. In a log-linearized version
of the model, the resource constraint (10) implies that ˆ ct =ˆ yt, while (2), (5), (7), and
(11)-(14) become
ˆ at = ρaˆ at−1 + εat, (15)
ˆ et = ρeˆ et−1 + εet, (16)
ˆ zt = εzt, (17)
ˆ xt = Etˆ xt+1 − (ˆ rt − Etˆ πt+1)+( 1− ω)(1 − ρa)ˆ at, (18)
ˆ πt = βEtˆ πt+1 + ψˆ xt − ˆ et, (19)
ˆ xt =ˆ yt − ωˆ at, (20)
and
ˆ gt =ˆ yt − ˆ yt−1 +ˆ zt (21)
12for all t =0 ,1,2,.... To assist in the econometric analysis of these equations, the new
parameter ω in (18) and (20) has been deﬁned as ω =1 /η and the new parameter ψ in
(19) has been deﬁned as ψ = η(θ − 1)/φ. The transformed cost-push shock ˆ et in (19) has
been deﬁned as (1/φ)ˆ θt,s ot h a ti n( 1 6 ) ,ρe = ρθ and the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated
innovation εet is normally distributed with standard deviation σe =( 1 /φ)σθ.
In this linear system, (15)-(17) govern the behavior of the preference, cost-push, and
technology shocks ˆ at, ˆ θt,a n dˆ zt, while (20) and (21) serve to deﬁne the output gap ˆ xt and
t h eg r o w t hr a t eo fo u t p u tˆ gt. Equation (18) takes the form of the expectational IS curve, and
(19) is a version of the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Note that although the preference
and technology shocks ˆ at and ˆ zt do not appear explicitly in the model’s Phillips curve, both
enter implicitly through the deﬁnition of the output gap ˆ xt.1 More traditional analyses of the
Phillips curve, such as Ball and Mankiw’s (2002), typically draw a distinction between shocks
that aﬀect the natural rate of unemployment and shocks that do not. Here, by analogy, (19)
draws a distinction between the shocks ˆ at and ˆ zt that impact on the eﬃcient level of output
and the shock ˆ et that does not.
Note, too, that in the absence of the cost-push shock ˆ et, the IS and Phillips curves (18)
and (19) imply that the central bank can stabilize both the inﬂation rate and the output gap
by adopting a monetary policy that allows the real market rate of interest ˆ rt−Etˆ πt+1 to track
the natural rate of interest, deﬁned as (1−ω)(1−ρa)ˆ at. As emphasized by Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1999), Gali (2002), and Woodford (2003), only the cost-push shock confronts the
central bank with a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output gap stabilization as competing
goals of monetary policy.
132.7 The Central Bank
The central bank conducts monetary policy by following the modiﬁed Taylor (1993) rule
ˆ rt − ˆ rt−1 = ρπˆ πt + ρgˆ gt + ρxˆ xt + εrt, (22)
according to which it raises or lowers the short-term nominal interest rate ˆ rt in response
to deviations of inﬂation ˆ πt, output growth ˆ gt, and the output gap ˆ xt from their steady-
state levels. When adopting a rule of this form, the central bank takes responsibility for
choosing the steady-state inﬂation rate π; it also chooses the response parameters ρπ, ρg,
and ρx. In particular, a positive response of the interest rate to movements in inﬂation,
as measured by ρπ, insures that this policy rule remains consistent with the existence of a
unique rational expectations equilibrium; for details, see Parkin (1978), McCallum (1981),
Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Kerr and King (1996), and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000).2
Since it is unclear whether it is more appropriate to depict the central bank as responding
t om o v e m e n t si no u t p u tg r o w t h – av a r i a b l et h a ti tc a no b s e r v ed i r e c t l y – o rm o v e m e n t si n
the output gap–a variable that is more closely related to the representative household’s
welfare–both measures of real economic activity appear in this interest rate rule. Finally,
in (22), the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation εrt is normally distributed with
standard deviation σr.
3 Econometric Strategy and Results
Equations (15)-(22) now form a system involving three observable variables–output growth
ˆ gt,i n ﬂation ˆ πt, and the short-term nominal interest rate ˆ rt–two unobservable variables–
stochastically detrended output ˆ yt and the output gap ˆ xt–and four unobservable shocks–to
preferences ˆ at, desired markups ˆ et, technology ˆ zt,a n dm o n e t a r yp o l i c yεrt.T h es o l u t i o nt o
14this system, derived using Klein’s (2000) modiﬁcation of the Blanchard-Kahn (1980) pro-
cedure, takes the form of a state-space econometric model. Hence, the Kalman ﬁltering
algorithms outlined by Hamilton (1994, Ch.13) can be applied to estimate the model’s pa-
rameters via maximum likelihood and to draw inferences about the behavior of the model’s
unobservable components based on the information contained in the three observable series.
Here, this econometric exercise uses quarterly United States data running from 1948:1
through 2003:1. In these data, quarterly changes in seasonally-adjusted ﬁgures for real GDP,
converted to per-capita terms by dividing by the civilian noninstitutional population, age
16 and over, serve to measure output growth. Quarterly changes in the seasonally adjusted
GDP deﬂator yield the measure of inﬂation, and quarterly averages of daily readings on the
three-month US Treasury bill rate provide the measure of the nominal interest rate.
This econometric exercise has as its principal goal, of course, the objective of measuring
the contributions made by the various shocks in driving ﬂuctuations in the model’s observable
and unobservable variables. With this goal in mind, the empirical strategy followed here
begins by adding lagged output gap and inﬂation terms to the model’s IS and Phillips
curves, so that (18) and (19) are replaced by
ˆ xt = αxˆ xt−1 +( 1− αx)Etˆ xt+1 − (ˆ rt − Etˆ πt+1)+( 1− ω)(1 − ρa)ˆ at (23)
and
ˆ πt = β[απˆ πt−1 +( 1− απ)Etˆ πt+1]+ψˆ xt − ˆ et (24)
for all t =0 ,1,2,.... These modiﬁcations serve to guard against the possibility that estimates
of the purely forward-looking speciﬁcation might falsely attribute dynamics found in the
data to serial correlation in the shocks when instead those dynamics are more accurately
modelled as the product of additional frictions–not explicitly considered here–that give
15rise to backward-looking behavior on the part of households and ﬁrms. The new parameters
αx and απ in (23) and (24) both lie between zero and one; conveniently, they summarize the
importance of backward-looking elements in the economy. And if, in fact, the data do prefer
the original microfounded speciﬁcations (18) and (19) to the more general alternatives (23)
and (24), the estimation procedure remains free to select values of αx and απ equal to zero.
The empirical model consisting of (15)-(17) and (21)-(24) has 16 parameters: z, π, β, ω,
ψ, αx, απ, ρπ, ρg, ρx, ρa, ρe, σa, σe, σz,a n dσr. Among these parameters, z and π serve only
to pin down the steady-state values of output growth and inﬂation; they have no impact on
the model’s dynamics. Hence, prior to estimating the remaining parameters, z is set equal
to 1.0048, matching the average growth rate of per-capita output in the data, which equals
1.95 percent on an annualized basis. Likewise, π is set equal to 1.0086, matching the average
inﬂation rate in the data, which equals 3.48 percent when annualized.
A problem then arises, because according to the model, the steady-state nominal interest
rate is determined as r = π(z/β). Given the settings for z and π, the model requires a
value of the representative household’s discount factor β that exceeds its upper bound of
unity to match the average nominal interest rate in the data, which equals 5.09 percent
when annualized. Fundamentally, of course, this problem stems from Weil’s (1989) “risk-
free rate puzzle,” according to which representative agent models like the one used here
systematically overpredict the historical returns on US Treasury bills. To help resolve this
diﬃculty, the model’s restrictions are loosened slightly: the parameter β is simply set equal
to 0.99, implying an annual discount rate of 4 percent, and the steady-state nominal interest
rate is treated as an additional parameter that is then set to match the average nominal
interest rate in the data.3 In eﬀect, this procedure allows the series for output growth,
inﬂation, and the interest rate to be accurately demeaned before using them for maximum
likelihood estimation. Again, this approach guards against the possibility that otherwise, the
estimated model will attempt to account for systematic deviations of the observed variables
16from their steady-state levels by overstating the persistence of the exogenous shocks.
Preliminary attempts to implement the maximum likelihood procedure led consistently
to unreasonably small estimates of ψ,t h ec o e ﬃcient on the output gap in the Phillips curve
(24). Since, as noted above, ψ depends inversely on the price adjustment cost parameter φ,
these very small estimates of ψ translate into very large costs of nominal price adjustment.
Hence, in deriving the ﬁnal set of results, this parameter is also ﬁxed prior to estimation at
ψ =0 .1, the same value used previously in Ireland (2000, 2002a). The formulas displayed
in Gali and Gertler (1999) provide a convenient way of interpreting this parameter setting:
they imply that in a simpler version of the New Keynesian model in which price setting is
staggered according to Calvo’s (1983) speciﬁcation and in which utility is linear in hours
worked so that the output gap always moves in lockstep with ﬁrms’ real marginal costs, a
value of ψ =0 .1 corresponds to the case where individual goods prices are reset on average
every 3.74 quarters–or just a little more frequently than once per year.
And so, with z, π, β,a n dψ held ﬁxed, table 1 displays the maximum likelihood es-
timates of the remaining 12 parameters together with their standard errors, computed by
t a k i n gt h es q u a r er o o t so ft h ed i a g o n a le l e m e n t so fm i n u so n et i m e st h ei n v e r t e dm a t r i xo f
second derivatives of the maximized log-likelihood function. Looking ﬁrst at the individual
parameters, the point estimate of ω =0 .0617 is small and lies within one standard error
of zero. Since ω =1 /η by deﬁnition, this small estimate of ω translates into a very large
estimate of η–and hence a very inelastic labor supply schedule in the theoretical model.
In the empirical model with ψ = η(θ − 1)/φ =0 .1 held ﬁxed, however, ω serves mainly to
determine, via (20), the extent to which the preference shock ˆ at impacts on the eﬃcient level
of output Qt and hence on the output gap ˆ xt. The small estimate of ω,t h e r e f o r e ,s i m p l y
implies that the data prefer a version of the model in which the eﬃcient level of output
remains largely unaﬀected by the preference shock. The estimate of αx =0 .0836 is also
quite small and statistically insigniﬁcant, and the estimate of απ lies up against its lower
17bound of zero, providing evidence in support of the purely forward-looking versions of the IS
and Phillips curves. These results echo those reported previously in Ireland (2001), a study
that focuses more speciﬁcally on the importance of backward-looking elements in the New
Keynesian Phillips curve.
The large and signiﬁcant estimates of ρπ =0 .3597 and ρg =0 .2536 suggest that his-
torically, Federal Reserve policy has responded strongly to movements in both inﬂation and
output growth; the much smaller estimate of ρx =0 .0347 indicates that the welfare-theoretic
output gap as deﬁned by the New Keynesian model has played less of a role in the policy-
making process. The estimates of ρa =0 .9470 and ρe =0 .9625 imply that, like the model’s
technology shock, the preference and cost-push shocks are highly persistent. Finally, the
estimates of σa =0 .0405, σe =0 .0012, σz =0 .0109,a n dσr =0 .0031 all appear large
compared to their standard errors, suggesting that all four shocks contribute in some way
towards explaining movements in the data. And, interestingly, the estimate of σz =0 .0109
for the standard deviation of the innovation to the technology shock is of the same order
of magnitude as the calibrated values assigned to this parameter in Kydland and Prescott
(1982), Cooley and Hansen (1989), and other real business cycle studies.
Thus, the individual parameter estimates shown in table 1 suggest that while the real
business cycle model’s technology shock continues to play a role in the New Keynesian model,
the competing shocks–to preferences, desired markups, and monetary policy–take on some
importance as well. To dig deeper into these issues, ﬁgure 1 plots the impulse responses of
output, inﬂation, the nominal interest rate, and the output gap to each of these four shocks.
The graphs show that after a one-standard-deviation preference shock, output growth
rises by slightly more than 50 basis points–that is, one-half of one percentage point–and
the annualized rate of inﬂation increases by about 28 basis points. Under the estimated
policy rule, these movements in output growth and inﬂation push the short-term nominal
interest rate up by 65 basis points and, in fact, hold the short-term rate well above its
18steady-state level for more than four years after the shock. The output gap increases as well.
Meanwhile, a one-standard-deviation cost-push shock increases output growth by 25 basis
points and reduces the annualized inﬂation rate by 140 basis points. The fall in inﬂation
allows for an easing of monetary policy under which the short-term nominal interest rate
falls by about 30 basis points and, again, remains well away from its steady-state level for
more than four years. Since, as noted above, the cost-push shock leaves the eﬃcient level of
output unchanged, the increase in the equilibrium level of output leads to a sizeable rise in
the output gap, which is ampliﬁed and propagated by the systematic monetary easing.
A one-standard-deviation technology shock increases output growth by 53 basis points
and lowers the annualized inﬂation rate by about 75 basis points; on balance, these changes
generate a small increase in the short-term nominal interest rate. And since the eﬃcient level
of output responds strongly to the technology shock, the output gap falls even as output
growth rises in this case.
Finally, the estimated monetary policy shock translates into an exogenous 21-basis-point
increase in the short-term nominal interest rate, which dies oﬀ over a period of about two
years. This monetary tightening causes output growth to fall by 63 basis points and inﬂation
to fall by 83 basic points; the output gap falls sharply as well.
Looking across all of these impulse responses provides some insight into how the various
shocks are identiﬁed in the estimated New Keynesian model. The preference shock and the
monetary policy shock, for instance, both work to increase the nominal interest rate. But in
the case of the preference shock, this rise in the interest rate coincides with faster rates of
output growth and inﬂation, whereas after the monetary policy shock, output growth and
inﬂation both fall. Likewise, the cost-push shock and the technology shock both work to
increase the rate of output growth and lower the rate of inﬂation, but the cost-push shock
leads to a decline in the nominal interest rate and opens up a positive output gap while
the technology shock generates a rise in the nominal interest rate and produces a negative
19output gap. Furthermore, according to (5) and (7), only the technology shock can impact
permanently on the level of output. Hence, in ﬁgure 1, the positive response of output
growth that follows immediately from a favorable cost-push shock must be oﬀset later by a
sustained period of slightly below-average output growth, whereas the positive response of
output growth that follows a favorable technology shock is never reversed.
Looking across all of these results also suggests that the technology shock plays, at most,
a supporting role in this estimated New Keynesian model. Instead, in ﬁgure 1, the monetary
policy shock generates the largest movements in output growth, the cost-push shock drives
the largest changes in inﬂation, and the preference shock gives rise to the largest responses
in the short-term nominal interest rate. Table 2 conﬁrms these ﬁndings by decomposing the
forecast error variances in output growth, inﬂation, the short-term nominal interest rate,
and the output gap into components attributable to each of the four shocks.
The results of these variance decompositions show that technology shocks make their
largest contribution in explaining movements in output growth, accounting for about 25 per-
cent of the ﬂuctuations in that variable across all forecast horizons. Even for output growth,
however, the preference shocks contribute nearly the same amount–20 to 25 percent–and
the monetary policy shocks account for considerably more–almost 40 percent. Moreover,
consistent with the impulse response analysis, the variance decompositions reveal that the
cost-push shock dominates in explaining movements in inﬂation and the output gap, while
the preference shock is most important in driving movements in the nominal interest rate.
Uniformly, then, these results point to the same conclusion: in the estimated New Key-
nesian model, the preference, cost-push, and monetary policy shocks all appear to be more
important than the technology shock in explaining the dynamic behavior of key macroeco-
nomic variables. But are these ﬁndings robust? Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) formal-
ize the idea that the monetary policies adopted by Federal Reserve Chairmen Volcker and
Greenspan diﬀer from those pursued by their predecessors by showing that the coeﬃcients
20of an estimated Taylor (1993) rule shift when the sample is split around 1980. Moreover,
Kim and Nelson (1999), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), and Stock and Watson (2003)
ﬁnd that a shift in the time-series properties of real GDP occurs at roughly the same point
in the United States data, raising the possibility that diﬀerent sets of shocks hit the Amer-
ican economy before and after 1980. Table 3, therefore, presents the results of one check
for robustness by showing what happens when the model is reestimated with data from two
disjoint subsamples: the ﬁrst running from 1948:1 through 1979:4 and the second running
from 1980:1 through 2003:1.
In table 3, the estimated policy coeﬃcients ρπ, ρg, ρx do shift across subsamples, consis-
tent with Clarida, Gali, and Gertler’s (2000) ﬁndings. Here, in particular, Federal Reserve
policy appears to have become more responsive to movements in all three variables–inﬂation,
output growth, and the output gap–during the post-1980 period. Moreover, evidence of in-
stability appears for other parameters as well. Most notably, the estimate of αx =0 .2028
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for the pre-1980 period, suggesting that backward-looking
behavior on the part of consumers is more important in explaining the data from the earlier
subsample. In addition, the cost-push shocks become considerably smaller but considerably
more persistent moving from the ﬁrst subsample to the second.
Figure 2 displays impulse responses generated from the model as estimated with pre-
1980 data; similarly, table 4 repeats the forecast error variance decompositions for that
earlier subsample. The results of these exercises ﬁt nicely with less formal accounts of
postwar United States economic history. In particular, the variance decompositions reveal
that for the pre-1980 period, monetary policy shocks assume an even greater importance
in generating ﬂuctuations in output growth; and while the cost-push shock continues to
e x p l a i nal a r g ef r a c t i o no ft h em o v e m e n t si ni n ﬂation, the monetary policy shock emerges
as an equally signiﬁcant driving force for that variable as well. Meanwhile, the impulse
response of the interest rate to a pre-1980 monetary shock traces out a stylized pattern of
21“stop-go” policy, according to which an initial tightening is quickly reversed, presumably
in an attempt to partially oﬀset the negative eﬀects on output. For the pre-1980 period,
therefore, these results point to monetary policy as a major destabilizing inﬂuence on the
United States economy; and even more so than in the full sample, technology shocks play a
subsidiary role.
T h ep o s t - 1 9 8 0r e s u l t ss h o w ni nﬁgure 3 and table 5, on the other hand, display some
diﬀerences. There, monetary policy contributes less to macroeconomic instability and the
technology shock becomes more important in driving movements in output growth. These
results, too, display some coherence with popular accounts that attribute the superior perfor-
mance of the United States economy during the 1990s to improved monetary policymaking
coupled with unexpected gains in productivity of exactly the type captured by the real
business cycle model’s technology shock.4 Nevertheless, even in table 5 where the technol-
ogy shock appears most important, it still explains less than half of the variation in output
growth across all forecast horizons. And, once again, cost-push and preference shocks explain
most of the action in inﬂation and the nominal interest rate.
4 Conclusions and Implications
This paper develops a New Keynesian model in which three additional disturbances–to
households’ preferences, to ﬁrms’ desired markups, and to the central bank’s monetary policy
rule–compete with the real business cycle model’s technology shock in driving aggregate
ﬂuctuations. It then applies maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters of this New
Keynesian model and uses the estimated model to assess the relative importance of these
various shocks in accounting for the dynamic behavior of output growth, inﬂation, and
interest rates as seen in the postwar United States data.
The empirical results, described in detail above, point to monetary policy shocks as a ma-
22jor source of instability in output growth, particularly in the period before 1980. Meanwhile,
the markup, or cost-push, shock emerges as the most important contributor to movements in
inﬂation, and the preference shock is identiﬁed as the principal factor behind movements in
the short-term nominal interest rate. Throughout, the technology shock plays only a mod-
est role. Even during the post-1980 period, where they appear most important, technology
shocks account for less than half of the observed variability in output growth and an even
smaller fraction of the variation in inﬂation and interest rates. Overall, these results serve
to weaken the links between the New Keynesian models of today and the real business cycle
models from which they were originally derived.5
Long and Plosser (1983) emphasize one of the most striking implications of real business
cycle models: to the extent that aggregate ﬂuctuations are driven by technology shocks,
those ﬂuctuations are actually preferred by private agents and should not be oﬀset by ac-
tive stabilization policies. The results obtained here suggest that, by contrast, American
households would have most likely preferred a more stable path for the United States econ-
omy than the one that was actually observed. On the other hand, the results derived here
have a monetarist ﬂavor as well, suggesting that signiﬁcant improvements might have been
achieved simply by removing monetary policy as an independent source of instability–again,
especially during the years before 1980.
Finally, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), Gali (2002), and Woodford (2003) also work
with New Keynesian models that feature both technology and cost-push shocks. These
studies show that for monetary policymakers, only the cost-push shock generates a painful
trade-oﬀ between stabilizing the inﬂation rate and stabilizing a welfare-theoretic measure of
the output gap; in the face of technology shocks alone, then tension between these two goals
disappears. By highlighting the role of cost-push shocks in explaining the United States data,
therefore, the empirical results obtained here also suggest that Federal Reserve policymakers
have, in fact, faced diﬃcult trade-oﬀs throughout the postwar period.
23Of course, these results admit alternative interpretations. One could argue, for instance,
that the basic New Keynesian model used here ignores capital accumulation, an important
process through which technology shocks are propagated in most real business cycle models;
and, to be sure, extending the analysis performed here to account for the eﬀects of capital
accumulation remains an important task for future research. Furthermore, one could also
argue that the additional shocks introduced here actually work, within the econometric
model, to soak up speciﬁcation error in the microfounded, New Keynesian model. Even
under this last, more pessimistic, interpretation, however, the ultimate conclusions remain
much the same: presumably, one would still be led towards other speciﬁcations that go even
farther beyond the original, real business cycle model.
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1In addition, the technology shock would appear together with the preference shock in
24t h em o d e l ’ sI Sc u r v e( 1 8 )w e r ei tn o tf o rt h ef a c tt h a th e r e ,t e c h n o l o g yi sa s s u m e d
to follow a pure random walk. See the earlier version of this paper, Ireland (2002b),
for an alternative implementation of the same exercise conducted here, but where the
technology shock follows a stationary autoregressive process instead.
2Fuhrer and Moore (1995), in particular, also use an interest rate that is speciﬁed in terms
of the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced interest rate; they provide a detailed explanation of how a rule
of this form supports a unique equilibrium in which the interest rate is stationary in
levels.
3Of course, an alternative solution to this problem could be found by allowing for a de-
parture from the logarithmic form of the representative household’s preferences over
consumption. As indicated above, however, this logarithmic form is essential if the
model is to be consistent with balanced growth.
4Also, Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2003) present related results: their study uses a more
conventional identiﬁed vector autoregression to show that post-1980 improvements in
US monetary policy include changes that have allowed the economy to respond more
eﬃciently to technology shocks.
5Accordingly, this paper joins several others from the recent literature, including Basu,
Fernald, and Kimball (1998), Gali (1999), and Francis and Ramey (2003), which take
av a r i e t yo fd i ﬀerent empirical approaches to distinguish between the real business
cycle and New Keynesian models and to argue against the importance of technology
shocks as a source of aggregate ﬂuctuations.
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σr 0.0031 0.0003Table 2. Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
Output Growth
Quarters Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy
Ahead Shock Shock Shock Shock
12 5 .66 .62 7 .54 0 .3
42 2 .21 3 .72 6 .33 7 .8
82 2 .11 3 .82 6 .33 7 .8
12 22.11 3 .92 6 .33 7 .7
20 22.01 4 .22 6 .23 7 .6
40 22.01 4 .52 6 .13 7 .4
∞ 21.91 4 .62 6 .13 7 .4
Inﬂation
Quarters Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy
Ahead Shock Shock Shock Shock
12 .36 1 .61 5 .92 0 .3
41 .86 4 .31 4 .91 9 .0
81 .76 6 .41 4 .01 7 .9
12 1.76 7 .31 3 .61 7 .4
20 1.76 8 .11 3 .31 6 .9
40 1.76 8 .81 2 .91 6 .5
∞ 1.76 9 .01 2 .91 6 .4Interest Rate
Quarters Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy
Ahead Shock Shock Shock Shock
17 6 .19 .16 .58 .3
47 8 .81 5 .82 .43 .0
87 6 .72 0 .21 .41 .7
12 75.02 2 .61 .01 .3
20 72.92 5 .30 .81 .1
40 70.52 7 .80 .70 .9
∞ 69.72 8 .70 .70 .9
Output Gap
Quarters Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy
Ahead Shock Shock Shock Shock
17 .77 .83 7 .14 7 .4
44 .34 7 .62 1 .12 7 .0
82 .27 2 .91 0 .91 4 .0
12 1.58 1 .37 .69 .7
20 1.18 6 .85 .36 .8
40 0.88 9 .74 .25 .3
∞ 0.88 9 .74 .25 .3
Note: Entries decompose the forecast error variance in each variable at each forecast horizon
into percentages due to each shock.Table 3. Subsample Estimates and Standard Errors
Pre-1980 Standard Post-1980 Standard
Parameter Estimate Error Estimate Error
ω 0.0000 0.0115 0.0581 0.0693
αx 0.2028 0.0704 0.0000 0.0213
απ 0.0000 0.1092 0.0000 0.0154
ρπ 0.3053 0.0591 0.3866 0.2526
ρg 0.2365 0.0601 0.3960 0.0615
ρx 0.0000 0.0068 0.1654 0.1136
ρa 0.9910 0.0112 0.9048 0.0583
ρe 0.5439 0.0061 0.9907 0.0133
σa 0.1538 0.1839 0.0302 0.0157
σe 0.0035 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002
σz 0.0104 0.0016 0.0089 0.0013
σr 0.0033 0.0007 0.0028 0.0004Table 4. Forecast Error Variance Decompositions: Pre-1980 Subsample
Output Growth
Quarters Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy
Ahead Shock Shock Shock Shock
11 0 .31 5 .01 2 .56 2 .3
49 .91 6 .21 4 .15 9 .8
89 .71 7 .71 4 .35 8 .4
12 9.61 7 .91 4 .25 8 .2
20 9.61 7 .91 4 .25 8 .2
40 9.61 7 .91 4 .25 8 .2
∞ 9.61 7 .91 4 .25 8 .2
Inﬂation
Quarters Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy
Ahead Shock Shock Shock Shock
14 .94 6 .81 6 .93 1 .4
46 .03 3 .52 1 .23 9 .3
85 .93 4 .52 0 .93 8 .7
12 5.83 4 .72 0 .83 8 .6
20 5.83 4 .72 0 .83 8 .6
40 5.93 4 .72 0 .83 8 .6
∞ 5.93 4 .72 0 .83 8 .6Interest Rate
Quarters Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy
Ahead Shock Shock Shock Shock
19 1 .22 .52 .24 .1
49 5 .40 .91 .32 .4
89 7 .10 .80 .81 .4
12 97.90 .60 .51 .0
20 98.60 .40 .40 .6
40 99.20 .20 .20 .4
∞ 99.60 .10 .10 .2
Output Gap
Quarters Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy
Ahead Shock Shock Shock Shock
18 .51 2 .42 7 .75 1 .4
46 .92 9 .32 2 .44 1 .5
86 .43 3 .52 1 .03 9 .0
12 6.43 3 .82 0 .93 8 .9
20 6.43 3 .82 0 .93 8 .8
40 6.43 3 .82 0 .93 8 .8
∞ 6.43 3 .82 0 .93 8 .8
Note: Entries decompose the forecast error variance in each variable at each forecast horizon
into percentages due to each shock.Table 5. Forecast Error Variance Decompositions: Post-1980 Subsample
Output Growth
Quarters Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy
Ahead Shock Shock Shock Shock
13 1 .90 .04 3 .92 4 .2
43 0 .31 .64 3 .62 4 .5
83 0 .31 .74 3 .52 4 .5
12 30.31 .74 3 .52 4 .5
20 30.31 .74 3 .52 4 .5
40 30.31 .74 3 .52 4 .5
∞ 30.31 .74 3 .52 4 .5
Inﬂation
Quarters Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy
Ahead Shock Shock Shock Shock
12 .84 9 .12 9 .51 8 .6
41 .56 1 .42 2 .81 4 .4
81 .56 9 .81 7 .61 1 .1
12 1.67 4 .51 4 .79 .3
20 1.48 0 .01 1 .47 .2
40 1.08 5 .98 .05 .1
∞ 0.69 1 .54 .83 .1Interest Rate
Quarters Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy
Ahead Shock Shock Shock Shock
18 0 .57 .27 .54 .8
48 1 .11 2 .63 .92 .4
87 7 .41 8 .52 .51 .6
12 73.02 3 .62 .01 .3
20 65.23 2 .11 .71 .0
40 52.84 5 .11 .30 .8
∞ 36.96 1 .60 .90 .6
Output Gap
Quarters Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy
Ahead Shock Shock Shock Shock
11 3 .50 .05 3 .03 3 .5
41 1 .67 .34 9 .73 1 .4
89 .22 4 .34 0 .82 5 .8
12 7.63 7 .43 3 .72 1 .3
20 5.85 2 .72 5 .41 6 .1
40 3.96 8 .01 7 .21 0 .9
∞ 3.96 8 .01 7 .21 0 .9
Note: Entries decompose the forecast error variance in each variable at each forecast horizon
into percentages due to each shock.Figure 1. Impulse Responses.
Each panel shows the percentage-point response of one of the model's variables to a one-standard-deviation shock.
The inflation and interest rates are expressed in annualized terms.
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0 4 8 12 16Figure 2. Impulse Responses: Pre-1980 Subsample.
Each panel shows the percentage-point response of one of the model's variables to a one-standard-deviation shock.
The inflation and interest rates are expressed in annualized terms.
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048 1 2 1 6Figure 3. Impulse Responses: Post-1980 Subsample.
Each panel shows the percentage-point response of one of the model's variables to a one-standard-deviation shock.
The inflation and interest rates are expressed in annualized terms.
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